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Few people would question the assumption that CEO's have a major impact
on the changes that occur in their organizations. Yet there is surprisingly
little analysis of just what the nature of this impact is likely to be, whether
it will vary by industry, company, or CEO attitude and style, and what empirical
data can be gathered to begin to shed some light on these issues.
We decided in 1987 to interview CEO's in a variety of companies, and, with
the assistance of a number of our Sloan Fellows and other graduate students, were
able to interview 94 executives all of whom were current or past CEO's, and, in
a few cases, COO's or presidents of divisions in conglomerates or multi-
divisional companies. But what is particularly distinctive about this research
is that it draws exclusively on the responses of the chief executives, a point
of some importance inasmuch as most of them felt that becoming a CEO changed
their role and attitudes in important ways.
The interviews focused on the personal attitudes and use of information
technology (IT) on the part of the CEO, and tried to elicit some of the
underlying assumptions behind the behavior and attitudes. Common dimensions
and variables were chosen for the interview protocol and subsequent analysis
but, because we felt it essential to get the CEO's spontaneous views, we asked
our interviewers to allow each CEO to tell his story in his own way. We then
combined the protocols in terms of common themes and found that coding
reliability was sufficient to pursue our analysis and to develop constructs,
but not high enough to allow us to generalize from this sample to the population
of CEO's.
This report attempts to fit the CEO responses into a framework that allows
us to analyze how CEO's impact organizational change. The results will be
presented in three parts:
1) A taxonomy of generic CEO behavior in terms of a model of the change
process, with examples from the cases;
2) An analysis of some of the factors that influence how a CEO will
actually structure his own role in a change process;
3) A set of change scenarios derived from an analysis of the interviews
that reflect the factors identified above. We were able to classify 84
of the CEO's into these scenarios.
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I.GENERIC CEO ROLES IN THE CHANGE PROCESS
Table 1 shows a model of the change process that was originally proposed
by Kurt Lewin and elaborated by me to explain changes that had planned,
non-voluntary, sometimes coercive elements to them (Lewin, 1952, Schein, 1961,
1972, 1987). Lewin correctly foresaw that in living systems any given stable
state was a "quasi-stationary" equilibrium that could be unfrozen, moved, and
refrozen, but he did not elaborate in detail how one actually unfreezes a system,
moves it, and then refreezes it. Since organizations tend to develop stable
routines and cultures, any organization change tends to occur in terms of the
stages identified in this model.
Insert Table 1 about here
As Table 1 shows, one can logically analyze and order the steps necessary
in each stage of the change process, though these steps often occur out of
sequence or simultaneously. Most of these steps occur through the intervention
of some human, to be labelled for this purpose a "change agent," and it is these
interventions on which I wish to focus. The question to be considered is whether
and how CEO's act as change agents, and around which of these steps.
IA. DISCONFIRHATION -- THE CEO AS A DISCONFIRMER
CEO's are uniquely suited to be disconfirmers because of their power
position in the organization, the information to which they have access, and the
responsibilities they have for maintaining organizational health. If things are
not going right in their view, they have the obligation to start an organization-
al change process by disconfirming the present state. Normal routines that have
become habits in an organization will not change unless someone ceases to respond
in the expected manner. Such disconfirming responses will obviously have more
weight if they come from the CEO than from someone lower in the hierarchy.
A clear example was one of our respondents who decided to start the change
process toward greater use of IT by announcing that he was personally going to
start using a desk top terminal and would henceforth send all critical
communications to his subordinates via electronic mail. In other words, if they
sent something by the old system he would simply not respond, and if they did
not get a terminal of their own, they would miss important messages from him.
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Disconfirmation in its simplest form means that things no longer work that
used to work. External circumstances can disconfirm as when sales fall off, or
the price of the company's stock falls, but more typically in organizational
change, it is a human change agent who starts the process by sending different
signals such as when a CEO brings the organization together and announces that
a major downturn in business will require downsizing, or that a change in
technology will require reorganization, or that a merger will require realignment
of people, or, as in the example above, he will change his own behavior in such
a way as to force others to change theirs. In each case, the initial impact of
the message can be described as a disconfirmation of the present behavior,
values, and assumptions.
If there is no disconfirmation from any source, no motivation to change
will be aroused. In a complacent organization, therefore, one of the CEO's most
critical functions is to generate information or announce decisions that will
have a disconfirming effect. But that is not enough, as many CEO's find.
IB. INDUCTION OF ANXIETY/GUILT -- THE CEO AS THE "BAD PARENT"
Disconfirming messages only have an impact if they connect to something
we care about. If the CEO ceases to respond to subordinate behavior in an area
irrelevant to their concern, they may simply not pay attention. However, if
continuing to behave in the old way makes the subordinates anxious because some
important goals may not be met, or makes them feel guilty because some valued
ideals will not be met unless a change occurs, then the message will be attended
to and discomfort will motivate some activity. It is this step that leads to
quips like "no pain, no gain," or the common assertion among change agents that
unless the system is "hurting somehow," no change will occur.
CEO's are clearly in a good position to play a key role in anxiety or
guilt induction because they are symbolically and psychologically in a parent
role. Even if they do not try to be parental, many subordinates will, for their
own psychological reasons, attribute parental power to them, and react strongly
to any signals that the CEO is pleased or displeased with them.
Probably the best example is the CEO who states outright or subtly implies
to his subordinates that their failure to learn to use IT means either that they
will fail in their work (anxiety induction), or that they are technologically
"backward" (guilt induction). Whether it is intended or not, a force toward
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change is induced when the subordinate feels obsolete, out of touch, or in some
other way uncomfortable about maintaining his or her old behavior.
IC. CREATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL SAFETY -- THE CEO AS THE "GOOD PARENT"
If too much anxiety or guilt is created, there is the danger that the
change targets will react defensively. One of the most likely defenses in this
situation is denial which, in this case, means that the subordinates will cease
to "hear" the disconfirming signals or will rationalize them away. Subordinates
will say to themselves-- "The boss doesn't really mean it; he is just showing
off his own new toy; he won't persist if I don't go along," and so on.
Given this state of affairs, motivation and readiness for change will not
really develop unless the target also feels psychologically safe. In other words,
giving up the old behavior, value, or assumption is intrinsically anxiety
provoking and people will not tolerate that kind of anxiety unless they feel some
support during the transition period (Schein, 1985).
In the case of the introduction of IT, they may feel that they will be
embarrassed by their slow learning ability, or by their inability to type, or
poor grammar or spelling, all of which they could hide by dealing directly with
a secretary. A common diagnostic error here is to assume that the resistance
to change is only the lack of motivation or the unwillingness to put out the
effort to learn something new. Much more likely is the defensive avoidance that
results from inability to face one's own presumed inadequacies if one does not
feel psychologically safe.
CEO's should and do attend to this issue in a variety of ways. One of
the commonest was to be totally inflexible on the ultimate goals to be achieved
(i.e. that desktop workstations would eventually be used by all senior
management), but to be highly flexible and supportive on 1) the pace of their
introduction, 2) the degree to which selected subordinates colild continue to
use their secretaries to enter data or memos, and, most important, 3) the amount
and type of training help they would provide no matter whnt the cost.
Subordinates could use individual coaches if "going to class" would cause
tension, and, in some cases, this meant individual coaching for long periods of
time. Some CEO's felt that sending their subordinates to formal classes would
threaten them further, so an individual coach would provide the psychological
safety necessary to learn something new.
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We cannot count how many CEO's played each of these three unfreezing roles
because local circumstances varied or we did not have the data. However, we
heard many vivid stories about the disconfirming and anxiety/guilt inducing
roles. It was less common to hear stories from CEO's about the necessity to
provide psychological safety, even though they were often in the best position
to provide it. We have to assume that they are either less sensitive to the need
for this step or are less willing to talk about it because it appears to be more
"soft."
ID. CREATING CHANGE THROUGH COGNITIVE REDEFINITION: STIMULATING IMITATION OR
IDENTIFICATION -- THE CEO AS ROLE MODEL
Ultimately what unfreezing does is to create a motivation and readiness
to change. The change target becomes sensitized to the need to learn something
new and starts to look around for relevant information. For lasting change to
occur, the target must not only learn new behaviors, but must also cognitively
redefine the issue so that new perceptions, attitudes, and feelings are created
as well. Sometimes such cognitive redefinition occurs prior to behavior change,
sometimes afterwards in an effort to reduce dissonance (Festinger, 1957). But
if it does not occur at all, we are dealing only with temporary change of the
sort one sees when people are coerced but not convinced.
The commonest source for new information is someone else in the
organization who seems to be "doing it right," in the sense that his or her
behavior is getting positively confirmed. Such role models not only provide
behavioral cues on what to do, but, more importantly, permit the target to
psychologically identify with the model and, thereby, absorb some of the new
cognitive point of view.
Many CEO's in our interviews discussed how the use of IT made it possible
to think in a fundamentally different way about "managing the business," and
part of their problem was to get across these new concepts. For some of their
subordinates this meant new assumptions about what a manager does and how a
business can and should be managed. If the CEO felt comfortable with his own
vision and level of understanding, he became a willing role model, teacher, and
object of psychological identification. If he did not, he could deliberately
stay away from the situation, conceal his own behavior to a greater degree, and
disconfirm efforts on the part of subordinates to imitate him or identify with
him.
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Some CEO's were outspoken about not wanting to be role models. They sent
the message "Do what I say., not what I do," a situation that arose frequently
with entrepreneurs who often recognized that their own personal style was unusual
and not necessarily the correct model for others. Another reason why some CEO's
deliberately tried not to be role models was that they wanted to avoid cloning
themselves. They believed that an effective organization needs innovative
behavior, so they stimulated as much as possible people's efforts to learn in
their own way and from their own sources.
If the CEO felt that he personally was the wrong model, but he believed
that a correct model existed and that learning from a role model was the best
way to learn, he could, of course, manage the change process by bringing into
the organization consultants, trainers, or other executives who represented what
he wanted to teach.
IE. STIMULATING COGNITIVE REDEFINITION THROUGH SCANNING-- THE CEO AS PROCESS
CONSULTANT
Imitation and identification have the virtue that learning can occur
rapidly and behavior can be standardized fairly quickly. However, if the goal
is for the new behavior to be innovative, then this change mechanism is a
disadvantage because it prematurely funnels all changes into the same channels.
If the CEO wishes to avoid such premature channeling, he must create
circumstances that will "help the subordinate to learn" by becoming more of a
process consultant and/or by sending subordinates "out into the world," to find
out what is out there and learn from it (Schein, 1969, 1987, 1988).
The essence of process consultation in this context is for the CEO to
become genuinely interested in the subordinate as a learner and to provide
whatever help the subordinate appears to need to learn new behavior, much as a
coach elicits from an athlete what that athlete is most capable of. The CEO as
process consultant does not advise, teach, or tell. Instead he listens, helps
the subordinate to identify what the problem is, and helps the subordinate figure
out what he or she will do about the problem. The CEO may offer options and
alternatives, but never recommends any particular course of action as the correct
one.
The best example of this kind of behavior is the one provided by McGregor
years ago in the description of the CEO who wanted his company to have a better
management development program. McGregor advised him not to design such a
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program and impose it, but simply to say to his key subordinates that starting
now he was expecting them to develop better management development processes
(disconfirming and anxiety inducing), that he did not know how to do this
(refusing to be a role model), but that he would start to measure their
performance and assign part of their annual bonus on the basis of how well they
were doing (anxiety induction), and that he would provide resources and help if
anyone needed it. He provided psychological safety through his tone and
demeanor, and through offering whatever resources they needed to make the program
happen. He also requested quarterly reviews to discuss what they each had done
(disconfirming and anxiety inducing), but during those reviews functioned as a
process consultant rather than as a teacher or boss (stimulating scanning).
This combination of circumstances forced the subordinates to scan their
environment, to seek help from consultants, to read, to ask around in other
companies, to create task forces, and in other ways get information on what to
do and how to do it. They were not under orders to come up with a common program
(another way of creating psychological safety), so each could creatively seek
his or her own solutions. The quarterly reports served as a good vehicle for
the CEO to confirm positively innovative efforts and to provide help. By the
end of the year the company had an active and effective management development
program.
In our interviews we saw many examples of this kind of forced scanning.
The CEO would announce that the company had to learn to make better use of IT,
would disclaim any special visions or skills in this area, but expect reports
on progress. Often with the help of the IT department, key subordinates would
create committees or task forces to scan the environment, inform themselves, and
begin to redefine in their own heads what tools and processes they needed. They
would then be in a position to educate the CEO.
If this scanning process was to work, however, the steps involved in
unfreezing had to have occurred. We found good examples of where CEO's had
earlier disconfirmed present practice by strongly asserting that "something"
was not right, without, however, offering a vision or a solution themselves.
IF. REFREEZING: CONSOLIDATING AND STABILIZING THE CHANGE IN THE CHANGE TARGET
AND THE SURROUNDING SOCIAL SYSTEM-- THE CEO AS REINFORCER
One of the most frustrating aspects of organizational change is that new
behaviors and attitudes do not stick once the initial "Hawthorne Effect" is
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gone. The system either reverts to its original state or moves in some brand
new direction that may not be desired by the change agent if the new behavior
or attitudes are not "refrozen." What this means is that the new response must
fit into both the personality of the change target and into his or her key
relationships. Otherwise a new unfreezing process begins because of personal
discomfort or disconfirmation by others in the system.
In order to avoid either of these undesirable outcomes, change agents
generally favor projects that involve as much of the total system as possible,
and encourage change mechanisms that draw more on scanning than identification
or imitation. If a person learns through scanning he or she automatically
incorporates only things that fit into the personality, whereas with imitation
and identification one often adopts behavior to please the role model, only to
drop it when the role model is no longer an audience.
The implications for CEO behavior are obvious. If the CEO is the original
change agent, he must view as his change target entire groups or sub-systems,
not isolated individuals, and he must avoid becoming the object of imitation.
Finally, since he is a prime audience for and reinforcer of change, when change
in the right direction occurs, he should strongly confirm the new behavior and
attitudes.
We infer from our interviews that many CEO's were sensitive to these kinds
of issues, but only at an intuitive level. They did not talk as articulately
about group norms and the subtleties of change as they did about unfreezing and
setting a direction for change. And how they chose to reinforce had much to do
with their vision for IT and the longer range goals they saw for it, a topic we
will discuss below.
SUMMARY
I have tried to show that one can classify CEO change agent behavior in
terms of a model of the change process. By identifying the separate components
of the change process, one can analyze what may be missing and what behavior,
therefore, the CEO should especially concentrate on.
In ongoing change programs one will see various of these roles being played
simultaneously and repeatedly as the change process works its way through the
system. Each time a new subsystem is encountered a new unfreezing, changing,
and refreezing cycle has to begin. The effective CEO as change agent will
constantly monitor what is needed and supply the missing functions rather than
trying to play all of the roles himself. And his consistency over long periods
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of time with respect to what he confirms and what he disconfirms will play a
critical role in the ultimate success of the total change effort.
II. FACTORS INFLUENCING CEO CHANGE AGENT BEHAVIOR
Having identified the generic change agent roles, we now need to know
what, if anything, will determine how a given CEO will actually behave in the
process of initiating and managing change. The factors identified below can
all be though of as "partially causal" or influential, and they probably act in
complex combinations rather than as single forces (see Figure 1). In terms of
change theory, each factor can be thought of as either a "driving" force leading
to increased pressure for the system to move in a certain direction, or as a
"restraining" force leading to resistance (Schein, 1985, 1987).
Insert Figure 1 about here
IIA. CEO BASIC ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY.
It was our own assumption that whether they were explicitly aware of it
or not, all CEO's had a set of assumptions about IT and a vision of what it could
or could not do for them. A typology of such assumptions based on 1) basic
faith that IT is a good thing for organizations, and 2) conviction that those
things will or will not come about, is shown in Table 2 and Figure 2.
Insert Table 2 and Figure 2 about here
Though the coding was not always totally reliable, we were able to agree
enough on the basic types to give a rough approximation of how many of our CEO's
fell into each basic category, as shown in Table 3 (based on the 84 cases
analyzed later).
Insert Table 3
In terms of basic assumptions, one can see a degree of realism prevailing.
A few CEO's were totally utopian about the potential of IT, but the bulk of them
were realistic about the difficulties of changing their organizations. Both of
these groups would be expected to exert primarily driving forces in the sense
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that they would try to unfreeze and change their organizations. The ambivalents
and those that saw IT as "merely a tool," clearly were more cautious in their
approach to implementation and would thus be expected to be as much on the
restraining as driving force side. There were few real skeptics, so one would
not expect strong restraining forces from CEO's except in the form of caution
about the potential costs of IT.
IIB. SPECIFIC IT VISIONS.
For those CEO's who had a positive vision for IT, it is important to
distinguish the nature and strength of that vision if one is to decipher further
how they would behave in the change agent role. Because we were limited to
interview data, we do not have detailed information about this aspect of CEO
attitudes and behavior, but it is nevertheless important to outline the major
possibilities. For this purpose it is useful to distinguish several levels of
"impact" of IT on organizations, as shown in Table 4.
Insert Table 4 here
1. THE VISION TO AUTOMATE.
Some CEO's in our sample saw the ultimate role of IT to be a way of
replacing expensive, unreliable human labor with sophisticated robots, systems,
and other IT devices. The promise of IT for them was that it would ultimately
save money, improve quality, and, thereby, make the organization more effective.
They tended to look at their organizations from a manufacturing point of view
and were preoccupied with cost and/or technological issues.
Such CEO's would tend to be less utopian and more ambivalent or skeptical.
The change agent role that they would be most likely to play is either to
disconfirm the present cost structure by insisting on automation, or by
disconfirming the present use of technology by insisting on technological
upgrading. In both cases they would focus more on the primary role of IT in the
manufacturing process and would be relatively less sensitive to the possible
role of IT in the management system or the impact on the management system of
the automation they were advocating.
As has also been pointed out, though this vision has long range
implications technologically and may involve major capital expenditures, it
often proves to be short-sighted because the human implications are not carefully
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thought through and the systems in the end do not work as well as they should
because they do not take advantage of operator creativity and innovation. In
other words, the deeper assumption that human behavior can be automated in a
complex technological environment may not be valid in some cases.
2. THE VISION TO INFORMATE UP-- "CONTROL UTOPIA"
The term "informate" is taken from Zuboff (1988) and refers to the impact
that IT has in making previously concealed parts of a system's processes visible
more widely both to people higher up and lower down in the organization. Some
CEO's saw IT to be the "ultimate management control tool." They assumed that
by installing the right kind of information system they could be completely
informed about every aspect of every operation in their organization. Such
information would enable them to pinpoint problems rapidly and set into motion
remedial measures.
Needless to say such a vision appeals to the more control oriented
executive and probably is functionally similar to the automation solution except
that what is being automated here is not the production process but the control
process. The human organization is being replaced with an information system.
Toward this ultimate goal a number of CEO's insisted on installing terminals on
their own and their subordinates' desks in order to facilitate the introduction
of a complete communication network and a common information and control system.
Some of the resistance encountered from subordinates was probably motivated
by their recognition that once such a system was installed, it could easily be
abused by a control oriented CEO. Abuse here would be micro-management on the
part of the CEO, thereby undermining the rest of the organization, and possibly
even the validity of the information fed into the system because of the tendency
to falsify input data as a counter reaction to the discomfort and anxiety that
the system creates. Unfortunately the system designers often collude with this
type of CEO by reassuring him that they can make the system invulnerable to any
kind falsification.
In terms of our model of change, the type of CEO who is oriented toward
control via an upward informating system will be an effective disconfirmer, but
will have trouble really unfreezing the system because he will not be sensitive
to the need to provide psychological safety. He may successfully coerce change,
but the change will only be surface and unstable because it will not involve any
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cognitive redefinition on the part of the subordinates who are the change
targets.
Such CEO's may be utopian about the potential of IT, but they are
expressing an extreme degree of skepticism about human behavior, what McGregor
would have labelled "Theory X." The very existence of the complete information
and control system signals to the rest of the organization that top management
does not trust the human organization to inform and control itself adequately
(McGregor, 1960).
3. THE VISION TO INFORMATE DOWN
"Informating down" is what Zuboff observed to be the consequences of
computerizing production processes and creating automated factories. If the
production process was to be automated, it had first to be understood as a total
system. In order to teach operators how to manage the new processes, the whole
system had to be made transparent to them. Zuboff observed that not everyone
could make the transition from manual work and the use of all the senses to
primarily mental work that required a complex diagnosis of what was going on by
deciphering what a particular configuration of data on a computer screen or a
control panel revealed.
For those who could make the transition, the production process was
demystified. One consequence was that supervisors no longer had the power that
special knowledge or understanding had previously given them. This "knowledge
power" was now distributed throughout theFwcrioDycmiddle managers this loss of
power was a direct threat, but for CEO's looking to create the "factory of the
future" this could be an entirely positive vision if they also had a Theory Y
set of assumptions about human nature (McGregor, 1960) and were willing to push
operational control down in the organization.
In our interviews we could not always tell whether or not the executive
advocating this kind of IT solution was genuinely interested in "informating"
his organization, or whether he was secretly hoping for lower costs and more
centralized control. But at least in their words these CEO's were advocating
a much more radical IT usage than what was proposed in either of the above
visions.
In any case, such CEO's would be much more sensitive to the issues of
creating psychological safety, both for operators who had to drastically change
their concept of what their work would be in the future, and for middle managers
whose role might disappear altogether. They would also realize that changes of
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this magnitude would not occur without strong external and internal
disconfirmation and induction of guilt/anxiety, and thus be forced to consider
all of the stages of getting a change process started.
4. THE VISION TO TRANSFORM
A few CEO's saw IT as the basis for a complete transformation of their
organization and industry. They could see how IT would change the organization's
fundamental relationship to its suppliers and customers, how the introduction
of networking, executive support systems, teleconferencing, and other IT
innovations would fundamentally alter the nature of the products, markets, and
organizational structure, and how these in combination would alter organizational
boundaries, inter-organizational relationships, and even the management process
itself.
The role of hierarchy would change in that distributed information would
make local problem solving and lateral information sharing much more feasible,
and the role of the executive team in the strategy process would change if
modelling and various kinds of decision support tools would make it possible to
develop alternatives much more rapidly. In a sense IT would make it possible
to be simultaneously more centralized around basic strategy and goals, and more
decentralized around implementation and control.
Power and authority would shift away from position and status toward
knowledge and information, and leadership would become a function that is more
widely distributed as a function of the requirements of the task to be
accomplished. More emphasis would fall on groups and teamwork, and boundaries
between jobs and roles would become more fluid. That, in turn, would re- quire
a higher level of professionalization of the work force to deal with higher
anxiety levels resulting from role ambiguity (Hirschhorn, 1988).
We encountered a few executives who seemed to be pushing toward this kind
of vision but most of them acknowledged that it would take some time before IT
itself would be good enough and cheap enough to make this possible. They
correctly foresaw that such transformations would require major cltural change
that would take some time and effort to accomplish. Perhaps most troubling to
them was the implication that the present workforce might not be well enough
educated or trained to fulfill the necessary roles in the transformed
organization, an issue that is also present in the informated organization.
Such CEO's clearly fell into our utopian idealist category and their
behavior in terms of the change model seemed to be oriented toward consistent
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but careful unfreezing because of their concern that their organizations might
not be ready to handle the level of change ultimately required. They were, in
this sense, another group sensitive to psychological safety as an issue in the
change process.
In summary, the basic assumptions held by the CEO were obviously a critical
factor both in terms of how they saw the ultimate potential of IT and how
optimistic they felt about the implementation of various IT projects within their
organizations. But clearly, their own assumptions were not a sufficient
explanation of their behavior. We found in the interview data that a number of
other factors operated as powerful driving and restraining forces.
IIC. TECHNOLOGICAL REALITIES AND LIMITS
For many CEO's a major restraining force limiting their vision of IT was
their perception that the technology was not yet good enough or cheap enough to
deliver on its potential. Their change agent behavior would then be to press
harder on the IT community to improve the technology itself, while restraining
their organization in order not to "waste money" on solutions that might not work
well enough anyway.
Such perceptions might arise either from total lack of experience with
computers or, paradoxically, from great experience with computers in that they
could see through some of the promises that their own IT people were making.
And we found a surprising number of CEO's who argued that desk top work stations
were not an appropriate tool for them in their role as CEO even though they had
used them extensively and happily in all of their prior jobs. They felt that
IT did not have the capacity to deal with the soft, probabilistic, rapidly
changing kind of information that they had to deal with in their CEO role. As
a consequence such CEO's might strongly resist the use of IT in the executive
suite but drive its use at lower levels with great vigor.
IID. INDUSTRY REALITIES
One of the most powerful forces determining CEO attitudes and behavior
was the behavior of their competitors in their industry. CEO's often seemed
unsure how to use IT, how much to invest in it, how to assess its potential
benefits, and whether or not there were operational or strategic benefits to be
derived, so they scanned their competitors and tried to at least stay even.
What other companies were doing thus became a kind of benchmark for some
CEO's, especially those who had less personal experience with IT. They would
14
III
override their own convictions about IT if they found it necessary to do or not
do certain things simply because their competitors were or were not doing them.
It should be noted that in those companies where the CEO was using this
kind of benchmarking, IT managers could use information about what other
companies were doing as a change lever of their own to disconfirm the CEO's
present behavior and get him started on a change process of his own. In such
situations the IT manager acquired unusual power unless the CEO had his own net-
work of peer contacts to check out what other companies were doing.
A second powerful industry reality was the degree to which the industry
was intrinsically involved with information products and had, therefore, already
learned a great deal about IT. Particularly in the financial services,
transportation (airlines), and telecommunications industries there appeared to
be a generally higher level of insight into the realities of IT among CEO's,
and, because of the benchmarking noted above, we found the same kind of IT usage
in all of these companies.Some of the more aggressive CEO's who initiated total
IT change programs were found in companies that were already well versed at the
product level in the necessity for sophisticated IT solutions.
In contrast, the manufacturing industry seemed to be very heterogeneous,
with some companies trying very hard to introduce IT at all levels, while others
viewed it with total skepticism. Some of the CEO's who had been most "burned"
by past IT projects that failed or had proved to be overly expensive, came
primarily from manufacturing companies.
IIE. ORGANIZATIONAL REALITIES
Organizational size and age appeared to make a difference. Larger, older,
multi-divisional companies tended to have CEO's who delegated the major IT
decisions and implementation programs to special task forces and to divisional
management. In contrast, in young and/or small companies CEO's said they had
to be directly involved with IT matters at all times. They could not afford to
delegate such decisions or to hire IT staffs.
The more structurally decentralized the company, in the sense of having
multiple divisions and geographic units, the more the CEO felt constrained by
the presence of multiple sub-cultures that would be hard to tie together. Not
only was the initiative for IT innovations more likely to be in the units, but
the innovations themselves were more likely to be operational ones that were
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motivated and managed at unit level. Company wide integration efforts such as
electronic mail and common information and control systems were much harder to
implement in multi-unit structures. In such organizations CEO's often took the
role of monitor and controller of IT, regardless of their own assumptions about
it.
The company's financial condition was cited as a factor restraining IT
experimentation if money was in short supply and the company was trying to become
more profitable. Even if the CEO was very utopian in his personal vision, he
often had to put IT projects lower on the priority list. On the other hand, if
money was plentiful we found energetic utopian CEO's willing and able to push
through entire IT systems single handedly, even though no one could prove that
the innovations were cost effective or strategically critical.
Finally, the state of training of the senior management and employees was
cited by some CEO's as a constraining force. Sometimes these were experienced,
knowledgeable CEO's with a tho- rough background in IT who recognized that they
had to move slowly because their people were not ready for some of the more
sophisticated IT applications.
IIF. PERSONAL EXPERIENCE WITH COMPUTERS AND IT
Many of the CEO's were knowledgeable and experienced in the use of
computers and IT. Such knowledge could work either as a driving or restraining
force, however, because greater knowledge also meant greater insight into the
problems of IT, its probable costs, its technological limitations, and its
tendency to promise more than it could deliver.
SUMMARY
The six sets of factors identified by our CEO's as major influences on
their decisions with regard to IT are, of course, interrelated and interactive.
The most striking result, therefore, is the diversity of situations we
encountered at the level of the CEO. We were seeking the common elements in how
CEO's would structure their own behavior as change agents and found, instead,
that the multiplicity of technological, industry, organizational, and personal
forces operating made such generalizations very tenuous.
At the same time, we could see that not every CEO's situation was unique.
There were common patterns evident, so we set out to cluster the common factors
into a set of "implementation scenarios" (Sutherland, 1988).
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III. CEO IMPLEMENTATION SCENARIOS
The scenarios identified below were based on coding all 94 interviews and
looking for patterns and clusters in the data. The coding was not precise or
reliable enough to warrant actual correlations and factor analysis, so these
clusters are based more on inspection, as will be seen. The clusters accounted
for-84 of the cases, as will be shown in Table 6. The ten cases that did not
fit any cluster were omitted from this analysis. The results should be seen as
a basis for further hypotheses rather than generalizable findings, though we
found in follow-up inter- views in selected companies clear examples of each
scenario.
IIIA. "DELEGATING SKEPTICS"
This group of CEO's, comprising 20 percent of the population interviewed,
was characterized by a pattern of attitudes and self-described behaviors that
reflected basic doubts about IT. They were older than the other groups, were
found mostly in manufacturing companies, and played an essentially passive cost
containment role vis-a-vis IT.
They did not believe that CEO's should be involved in IT decisions, they
tended to respond to rather than initiate IT issues, they made IT implementation
decisions primarily in terms of their cost, did not see any critical reason for
personal use of terminals (only 12 percent used terminals), saw the negative
consequences of IT as being equal to the positive consequences in terms of
overall human impact of IT, and were the highest group in terms of the number
of negative effects of IT they cited, with the top of the list being that IT
tended to "waste time and resources."
In terms of our change model this type of CEO would be a restraining force
on IT implementation. He would not unfreeze the system nor would he be any kind
of role model, though he would encourage refreezing if he saw benefits. One can
presume that their IT vision was limited to automation and perhaps informating
up. In terms of their assumptions, 65 percent were rated as "ambivalent" and
only 35 percent were rated as "realistic utopians."
IIIB. "INFORMATION DEPENDENT SERVICE MANAGERS"
This group of CEO's, comprising roughly 14 percent of the group, were
usually in charge of medium size financial service organizations such as banks
and insurance companies that have had to develop their IT systems in order to
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remain competitive. They tended to be the youngest group and their most salient
attitude was that they seemed to take IT for granted.
In terms of IT related decisions they were predominantly in the "routine
review" category. They, like the skeptics, tended to respond rather than
initiate, they saw little need to get involved with implementation issues (partly
because their organizations had mature, competent IT departments), and they saw
themselves as supportive to IT implementation in their companies.
On personal use, the group was divided with 69 percent reporting no use.
In terms of positive and negative aspects of IT, this group was the most positive
in terms of human impacts and saw the fewest number of negatives overall. They
were highest in seeing IT as something that "helps people to think," "improves
service and company performance," "cuts personnel," "makes more information
available," "saves costs and time," and "provides major strategic/competitive
benefits."
I would guess that this group is the most committed to IT, with 31 percent
utopian idealists and 62 percent realistic utopians. Interestingly one of these
CEO's was a realistic skeptic but he clearly did not interfere with his company's
program. One would also hypothesize that this group would be high in seeing
the transformation potential of IT, partly because it is already happening in
their businesses and partly because they see the strategic potential of IT.
As change agents they present a mixed picture of being positive and
supportive, but not likely to initiate or be strong role models. The unfreezing
forces in their companies had probably begun to operate years ago due to economic
and competitive pressures, and further active change projects have tended to be
delegated more to the IT group.
IIIC. "HANDS ON ADOPTERS"
This group of CEO's, comprising 40 percent of the total, was distinguished
primarily by their belief that CEO's should be actively involved in TT decisions
(only 19 percent favored review by exception or no involvement), and in IT
implementation (only 5 percent favored little or no CEO role). Almost half
stated that CEO's should initiate IT projects (compared to 0 nd 15 percent in
the above two groups), and their companies were the highest in percentage of full
scale, aggressive implementation of IT. This group was spread over small,
medium, and large companies, but was predominantly in the manufacturing sector.
In age they were average.
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This group was the highest in favoring personal use by CEO's and highest
in actual reported use (49 percent reported some or extensive use). Their
attitude toward positive and negative aspects of IT was balanced in that they
saw more positives than negatives but only 16 percent said that the effect of
IT was "mostly positive" while 24 percent said that the positives and negatives
were about equal. They cited most of the positives that the information
dependent saw, but they saw many more negatives, almost as many as the skeptics
(41 percent saw IT as wasting time and resources, 38 percent said that people
resist learning it, and 30 percent said that it impedes thinking).
What we have in the hands on adopters is predominantly realistic utopians
(70 percent) with the remainder scattered in the other categories. By virtue
of their close involvement with IT decisions and implementation projects they
have acquired a more balanced and realistic point of view toward IT, suggesting
that their IT visions probably vary all the way from automation to transformation
depending on other factors.
It is in this group that one would find the most active change agents
among the CEO's, probably playing the whole gamut of change roles. Being the
most active users, they are also the most likely to be role models, but being
realistic they would see the value of encouraging scanning. It is in this group
that one would expect to see the most effective creation of psychological safety.
IIID. "THE POSITIVELY FOCUSED"
This group of CEO's, comprising another 20 percent of the total, is
distinguished by their positive, idealistic stance toward IT combined with a
rather hands-off approach and some evidence of Pollyannaish thinking about IT.
The hands on adopters discussed above feel positive but also see all the problems
because they are close to them. The positively focused, in contrast, are often
in very large companies (47 percent are in companies of over 50,000 employees)
where their own involvement in IT is minimal because the real action is down in
the divisions. Only a few of them have the conviction to impose common systems
at the corporate level if divisional opposition is strong, bt they feel that
they get their money's worth out of IT anyway because of utilization at lower
levels.
A number of them are in service oriented industries like telecommunications
and airlines where the use of IT is so central to their business that there is
little problem getting money for IT implementation. One hypothesis put forth
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by Sutherland is that these companies can afford to be idealistic because they
have not faced the cost issues that plague manufacturers. Their attitudes are
derived more from their background in the utilities industries where direct
competition and hence cost control was not a central issue.
The positively focused tend to have little or no involvement in IT
decisions because they have excellent technical staffs to whom they delegate,
but they are more likely to initiate and be supportive of implementation efforts
than the information dependent or skeptical groups. Their companies along with
those of the hands on adopters are the most aggressive implementers. They are
the highest group in terms of belief that the use of IT is critical for the CEO,
but only 41 percent of them are personal users.
Like the information dependent they are very positive about the human
impacts of IT and see virtually no negatives (hence the Pollyanna label), when
you contrast them with the hands on adopters. As might be expected they are
predominantly utopian idealists (41 percent) and realistic utopians (35 per-
cent). The remainder are ambivalent.
I would expect to find many CEO's in this group with strong visions of
organizational transformation. In a number of cases that we have analyzed we
see a CEO not only encouraging implementation throughout, but strongly unfreezing
his immediate executive team by strong disconfirmation of the old ways along with
provision of psychological safety to make the transition feasible. Some of our
best examples in the early section of this paper on executive change agent roles
came from this and the hands on adopter groups.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
What we have, then, in the implementation scenarios is two groups that
are relatively uninvolved but for opposite reasons. The information dependent
are knowledgeable, take IT for granted, and comfortably delegate IT issues. The
delegating skeptics are cynical, aloof, and controlling, seeing IT as just
another expensive tool to be watched carefully.
Then we have two groups that are involved, but in very different ways.
The hands on adopters personally push IT projects through and, thereby, become
very familiar with all the problems and prospects that this technology will bring
to organizations. On the other hand, we have the positively focused who are in
organizations that can afford to implement IT, who need IT in terms of their
core business, but who do not need to be personally and directly involved in
projects, and, therefore, are less familiar with IT problems and prospects.
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III
The change agent roles that these different executives will take will, of
course, differ with their basic orientation and the situation of their
organizations. As noted above, all of the CEO's were driven by the state of
affairs in their industry. Only a small number had utopian transformation
visions that went substantially beyond what other companies in their industry
were doing. Those few get singled out as heroic change agents by academics and
the media, but the reminder from our data is that they are a distinct minority.
The "bottom line" seems to be that CEO's find themselves in very complex
force fields and vary their behavior as change agents accordingly. They feel
that the realities of their particular situation in terms of the size, age,
structure, and financial condition of their companies, the technological
possibilities and limitations, industry benchmarks, employee readiness, and the
credibility and skill of their IT management, all have to be taken into account
in deciding how far and how fast to push the adoption of new IT tools. Many of
them believe, therefore, that this complexity calls for the CEO to be an
integrative force
instead of an IT zealot, though they acknowledge that future generations of
CEO's who will have been educated much more thoroughly in the possibilities of
the computer and IT, thus making it possible for them to take more of a hands
on adopter stance.
For the IT skeptic it will be reassuring to realize that there are a good
many CEO's out there who are cautious, who have been burned, and who, therefore,
are quite realistic about the limitations of today's IT solutions. On the other
hand, for the IT utopian it will be very reassuring to note that 40 percent of
our CEO's do involve themselves actively in IT projects, even if they personally
do not use desk top workstations, and many more take IT for granted as a
technology and a set of tools that will help their companies in many ways.
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A Stage Model of Planned Change
Unfreezing: Creating motivation to change
Disconfirmation
Induction of anxiety / guilt
Creation of psychological safety
Creating change through cognitive redefinition
Stimulating imitation or identification
Stimulating scanning
Refreezing: Stabilizing the change
Integration into personality
Integration into key relationships and social system
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Table 2
A Typology of CEO Assumptions about I.T.
I.T. UTOPIAN IDEALIST
This CEO sees nothing but benefits deriving from the increased use of I.T. in all areas
of his business and personal life. He may not see all these benefits in actual use, but
he believes firmly that in time all the benefits will be realized.
I.T. REALISTIC UTOPIAN
This CEO sees great potential benefits in I.T., but is not sure that they will all be
realized because of hidden costs, resistances in others, and various other sources of
difficulty that are not inherent in I.T., but in its implementation.
I.T. AMBIVALENT
This CEO sees some benefits in some areas but sees potential harm in other areas
and/or perceives that the costs may in the end outweigh the benefits; therefore, he
is ambivalent in the sense of wanting to push ahead, but being cautious and
doubtful at the same time.
I.T. REALISTIC SKEPTIC
This CEO is basically doubtful about the benefits of I.T., short-run or long-run, but
realizes that the appeal of the technology will bring much of it into organizations
anyway; given this reality the CEO must control carefully what is introduced so as to
minimize potential harm or excessive costs.
I.T. UTOPIAN SKEPTIC
This CEO believes that I.T. is primarily harmful in that it undermines other effective
managerial processes. It is not merely excessively costly, but actually harms
organizational effectiveness by encouraging the use of tools, categories of
information, and processes of doing work that are less effective than what is
presently or potentially possible in terms of other managerial models; he therefore
sees his role to be to minimize the harm that I.T. can do, to undermine its




























CEO Visions of the Potential Impact of I.T.
The vision to automate
The vision to informate up
The vision to informate down











CHARACTERISTICS OF CEO'S IN DIFFERENT IMPLEMENTATION SCENARIOS
DS*

























Co. Size: % Under 3000 Empl.
% 3000 to 50000 Empl.
% Over 50000 Empl.
What role is appropriate for CEO
in making IT decisions?
% Little or no role
% Review by exception only
% Routine review
% Hands on active in all decis.
What was your most recent role?
% None or review by exception
% Routine or active
What role is appropriate for CEO
in adopting and implementing IT?
% Little or no role
% Support/set example
% Be routinely personally involved
What was your own most recent
involvement?
% None
% Created supportive envir.
% Personally involved
DS-- Delegating skeptic (N 17, 20 %)
ID-- Information dependent (N 13, 14 %)
HOA-- Hands on adopter (N 37, 40 )
PF-- Positively focused (N 17, 20 )
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DS* ID* HOA* PF'
-- -- -- _____________________________--____ 
--_ _ -- --__ __ __ ____ __________
ow apropriate is it for CEO
Qo personally use IT?
% Critical 6 23 27 47
% Depends/matter of style 41 54 57 29
% Not helpful/inappropriate 53 23 16 24
Do you ersonally use terminal?
% Some or extensive use 12 31 49 41
% None 88 69 51 59
Perceived level of T implementa-
tion in companv?
% Aggressive implementation 0 38 73 64
% Supportive to impl. efforts 53 54 27 30
% Passive/support based on cost 47 8 0 6
What are the main barriers to
11T implementation?
% Human interface/user problems 24 85 46 65
% Lack of mgt. involv. or control 24 54 30 29
% Systems integration/networking 41 77 32 24
% Cost 47 69 54 41
% Low output/waste of capacity 41 15 41 18
Attitude toward overall human
impacts of IT
% Mostly positive 0 92 16 77
% More positive than negative 24 8 60 18
% Negatives equal positives 77 0 24 6
Positive aspects of IT
% Helps people think 47 92 49 41
% Makes people more efficient 47 62 59 65
% Makes more info. available 18 54 35 12
% Improves company performance 29 62 54 53








DS* ID* HOA* PF*
Areas of positive impact of IT
% Production/operations/mfg. 71 77 81 82
% Managerial decision support 77 31 87 59
% Strategic/competitive advant. 35 77 59 47
% Cost savings 23 85 46 23
% Time savings 6 85 38 18
Negative aspects of IT
% Impedes thinking 24 0 30 0
% Impedes communication 24 0 16 6
% Causes skills to deteriorate 24 8 11 0
% Wastes time and resources 59 8 41 12
% People resist learning it 24 15 38 24
Number of negatives cited
% None 12 61 13 59
% One 29 39 35 41
% Two or more 59 0 52 0
Basic assumptions about IT
% Utopian idealists 0 31 16 41
% Realistic utopians 35 62 70 35
% Ambivalent 65 0 11 24
% Realistic skeptic 0 8 3 0
% Utopian skeptic 0 0 0 0
DS-- Delegating skeptic
ID-- Information dependent

















































Figure 1. CEO Change Roles and Their Determinants
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